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ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIRD PARTY ACTIONS
In many cases where workmen's compensation benefits are claimed
and paid, the accident giving rise to the claim involves a third party
other than the employee and his employer. A simple example is a truck
driver who, while in the course and scope of his employment, is negli-
gently hit by another vehicle. This gives rise to a third party negligence
action in which all the traditional elements of damages can be claimed.'
To avoid a double recovery by the employee, however, the legis-
lature has enacted a lien system2 whereby the employer or his insurance
carrier3 may impose a lien upon the judgment or settlement obtained by
the employee, for the benefits paid by the employer under the work-
men's compensation laws.4 The employer can also join with the em-
ployee in bringing suit, intervene when suit is brought by the em-
ployee," or seek reimbursement through subrogation directly against the
third party where the employee fails to sue.' Labor Code section 3861
also allows the employer a credit, for the amount of the employee's net
recovery, against any future compensation payments for which the em-
ployer may become liable because of further temporary disability, or
permanent disability arising from the same accident. 7
Labor Code sections 3856 and 3860 give priority to the employ-
er's lien in the situation discussed above. Furthermore, they give the trial
court the authority to grant attorney's fees and litigation expenses out
of the judgment or settlement. This Note is concerned primarily with
attorney's fees and costs.
In a third party action, the employee's attorney is generally retained
on a contingent fee basis whereby a certain percentage of the recovery
constitutes his legal fee. The employer's attorney is normally retained
by the workmen's compensation insurance carrier on a permanent basis
and receives a fixed fee as opposed to the contingent fee arrangement
entered into by the employee and his attorney.
The code sections herein discussed were not meant to take the
1. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852.
2. id. §§ 3856, 3860.
3. Hereinafter both the workmen's compensation insurance carrier and the em-
ployer will be identified by the single word "employer."
4. These benefits are paid by the employer when there is an injury to an em-
ployee while working in the course and scope of his employment. The benefits in-
clude such things as lost wages and medical expenses. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600.
5. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3853.
6. Id. § 3852.
7. Id. § 3861.
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place of such agreements, but were intended to provide for a reasonable
recovery of expenses and fees in all cases where, through the prosecuting
attorney's efforts, there was a recovery for the unrepresented party,
whether that party was the employee or employer.8 Despite this laud-
able goal, the legislature and the courts have found it difficult to achieve
fairness and equality in the application of these statutes.
History of Sections 3856 and 3860 of the Labor Code
To appreciate the present meaning of sections 3856 and 3860, it
is helpful to understand some of their history. The language of these sec-
tions began to take their present form under statutory enactments in
1937. Section 3856 originally read as follows:
The court shall first apply, out of the entire amount of anyjudgment for any damage recovered by the employee, a sufficient
amount to reimburse the employer for the amount of his expendi-
tures for compensation. If the employer has not joined in the ac-
tion or has not brought action, or if his action has not been con-
solidated, the court, on application [by the employer] shall allow,
as a first lien against the entire amount of any judgment for dam-
ages recovered by the employee, the amount of the employer's
expenditure for compensation.9
This section failed to provide a procedure by which the employee's
attorney could be compensated for any service which he performed for
the nonparticipating employer. Consequently, the employer could
wait until the employee had, through the efforts of his attorney, either
negotiated a settlement or received a judgment against the third party
tortfeasor, and then claim a first lien against the proceeds without hav-
ing to pay any attorney's fees. This "free ride" was even worse from the
standpoint of the employee's attorney under a contingent fee contract,
since his fee was a percentage of the amount actually paid to the em-
ployee.
The problem was first dealt with by the California Supreme Court
in Dodds v. Stellar.'" The employee's attorney had sought reimburse-
ment for his efforts in obtaining a recovery for the employer after the
employer had exercised his lien rights under section 3856. The court
strictly construed the statute, stating that there was no statutory author-
ity for allowing fees or costs to be deducted from an employer's lien.
Consequently, it had no alternative but to deduct the full amount of the
lien from the entire judgment." The court stated that the legislative
8. See Eldridge v. Truck Ins. Exch., 253 Cal. App. 2d 365, 61 Cal. Rptr. 347
(1967); Branscum v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 232 Cal. App. 2d 352, 42 Cal. Rptr.
682 (1965).
9. Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 3856, at 274 (emphasis added).
10. 30 Cal. 2d 496, 183 P.2d 658 (1947).
11. Id. at 506, 183 P.2d at 664.
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intent was further manifested by the fact that when the employer brings
suit, attorney's fees were expressly provided for under section 3854.12
Since there was no similar provision in section 3856, the court concluded
that the legislature intended that no attorney's fees be deducted from
the employer's lien.1"
Justice Carter dissented, stating that the interpretation offered by
the court made the law unconstitutional; 4 if the statute was uncon-
stitutional, then the plaintiff's attorney should be awarded fees under
the equitable theory of representative suit or common fund.' 5
The legislative response to the Dodds decision was relatively swift.
A proviso was added to section 3856 in 1949:
[Wihere the employer has failed to join in said action and to be
represented therein by his own attorney, or where the employer has
not made arrangements with the employee's attorney to represent
him in the said action, the court shall fix a reasonable attorney's
fee, which shall be fixed as a share of the amount actually received
by the employer, to be paid to the employee's attorney on account
of the service rendered by him in affecting recovery for the benefit
of the employer, which said fee shall be deducted from any
amounts due the employer.' 6
This addition allowed the employee's attorney to be reimbursed
by the employer for the services performed for the employer. It left
no doubt that such fees would be subtracted from the part of the lien
actually received by the employer. At this stage in the historical de-
velopment of the statute, at least, some degree of equality was achieved
between the employer and employee and their attorneys with regard to
the payment of fees.
However, the California Supreme Court was reluctant to extend the
policy expressed in section 3856 (referring to judgments) to a similar
situation involving settlements under section 3860. In R.E. Spriggs,
Inc. v. Industrial Accident Commission,'8 the employee reached a settle-
ment with the third party tortfeasor and the commission awarded attor-
ney's fees to the employee's attorney out of the settlement. The em-
ployer then sought a credit against any further awards for compensa-
12. Id. at 504, 183 P.2d at 664.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 507, 183 P.2d at 665.
15. Id. at 510, 183 P.2d at 667.
16. Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 120, § 2, at 355 (emphasis added).
17. Section 3860 read as follows: "No release or settlement of any claim under
this chapter is valid and binding without notice to both employer and employee
and opportunity to the employer to recover the amount of compensation he has paid or
become obligated to pay. The entire amount of such settlement, or any settlement
without suit, is subject to the employer's full claim for reimbursement for his compen-
sation expenditures and liability." Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 3860, at 274.
18. 42 Cal. 2d 785, 269 P.2d 876 (1954).
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tion for the full amount of the employee's recovery, without any de-
duction for attorney's fees. While this credit was requested pursuant
to section 3861 of the Labor Code,19 any allowance for attorney's fees
was governed by section 3856 or 3860 depending on the nature of the
recovery. Under section 3856, there would have been no question that
attorney's fees could have been deducted from the amount of the credit,
but the supreme court decided that since the legislature had not put the
same language into section 3860, the court would not put it there by
implication.20 It held that the Industrial Accident Commission had
committed reversible error by not allowing the employer credit for the
full amount of the employee's recovery against any future compensation
payments that the employer might be required to make for the same
injury.
As with the Dodds case, the legislature was quick to respond; in
1957, a clause very similar to that added to section 3856 was added to
section 3860.21 On the basis of these sections, the employee's attorney
could now have the court award him fees from the employer's share of
the settlement or judgment where the employer failed to join in the em-
ployee's suit or make arrangements with the employee's attorney to
have his interests represented.2  Likewise, under the language of sec-
tion 3854 at that time,23 the employer's attorney had similar rights
for any recovery obtained for the employee through action by the em-
ployer.
Present Sections
In 1959, the last important legislative changes to sections 3856 and
19. At the time of the Spriggs case, section 3861 read as follows: "The commis-
sion is empowered to and shall allow, as a credit to the employer to be applied against
his liability for compensation, such amount of any recovery by the employee for his in-
jury, either by settlement or after judgment, as has not theretofore been applied to
reimburse the employer, or has not been applied to the payment of an attorney's fee
to the employee's attorney, pursuant to the provisions of Section 3856 of this code."
Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 3861, at 274, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 120, § 3,
at 356.
20. 42 Cal. 2d at 789, 269 P.2d at 878.
21. Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 615, § I, at 1825: "[W~here the employer has not
prosecuted any claim or action in his own behalf or has failed to join and participate
in the prosecution of any action presented by the employee's attorney to represent him
in the prosecution of said action or claim, the commission shall fix a reasonable
attorney's fee, which shall be fixed as a share of the amount actually received by the
employer, to be paid to the employee's attorney on account of services rendered by
him in effecting a recovery for the benefit of the employer, which said fee shall be
deducted from any amounts due to the employer."
22. These requirements are discussed in Bosch v. Standard Oil Co., 193 Cal. App.
2d 426, 14 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1961).
23. Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 3854, at 273, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1949, ch.
120, § 1, at 355, repealed, Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 1255, § 10, at 3390.
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3860 were made. The provision in section 3854 for attorney's fees
when the employer prosecuted the third party action was repealed,24 and
sections 3856 and 3860 were completely revised. The provisions per-
taining to attorney's fees discussed previously were discarded and new
methods for determining attorney's fees and expenses were set out, along
with the priority of their payment in relation to the employer's lien.25
Since the two sections in their present form are very similar, it is
possible to combine the discussion of the various provisions. Section
3856(a)26 and section 3860(b)2 7 now provide that if recovery is ob-
24. In addition to repealing section 3854, the legislature repealed all sections
necessary to avoid any inconsistencies. Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 1255, § 10, at 3390.
25. Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 1255, §§ 3, 7, at 3387, 3389.
26. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3856 reads as follows: "In the event of suit against
such third party: (a) If the action is prosecuted by the employer alone, the court
shall first order paid from any judgment for damages recovered the reasonable litigation
expenses incurred in preparation and prosecution of such action, together with a rea-
sonable attorney's fee which shall be based solely upon the services rendered by the
employer's attorney in effecting recovery both for the benefit of the employer and the
employee. After the payment of such expenses and attorney's fees, the court shall
apply out of the amount of such judgment an amount sufficient to reimburse the em-
ployer for the amount of his expenditure for compensation together with any amounts
to which he may be entitled as special damages under Section 3852 and shall order
any excess paid to the injured employee or other person entitled thereto.
"(b) If the action is prosecuted by the employee alone, the court shall first
order paid from any judgment for damages recovered the reasonable litigation expenses
incurred in preparation and prosecution of such action, together with a reasonable at-
torney's fee which shall be based solely upon the services rendered by the employee's
attorney in effecting recovery both for the benefit of the employee and the employer.
After the payment of such expenses and attorney's fee the court shall, on application
of the employer, allow as a first lien against the amount of such judgment for damages,
the amount of the employer's expenditure for compensation together with any amounts
to which he may be entitled as special damages under Section 3852.
"(c) If the action is prosecuted both by the employee and the employer, in a
single action or in consolidated actions, and they are represented by the same agreed
attorney or by separate attorneys, the court shall first order paid from any judgment
for damages recovered, the reasonable litigation expenses incurred in preparation and
prosecution of such action or actions, together with reasonable attorneys' fees based
solely on the services rendered for the benefit of both parties where they are repre-
sented by the same attorney, and where they are represented by separate attorneys,
based solely upon the service rendered in each instance by the attorney in effecting re-
covery for the benefit of the party represented. After the payment of such expenses
and attorneys' fees the court shall apply out of the amount of such judgment for dam-
ages an amount sufficient to reimburse the employer for the amount of his expenditures
for compensation together with any other amounts to which he may be entitled as
special damages under Section 3852.
"(d) The amount of reasonable litigation expenses and the amount of attorneys'
fees under subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of this section shall be fixed by the court.
Where the employer and employee are represented by separate attorneys they may
propose to the court, for its consideration and determination, the amount and division
of such expenses and fees."
27. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3860 reads as follows:
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tained solely through the efforts of the employer's attorney, then reason-
able expenses in effecting such recovery shall be deducted from the
employee's judgment or settlement along with reasonable attorney's fees.
Such an award is based upon the services rendered by the attorney in pro-
curing recovery for both the employer and the employee. From the
remaining sum, the full amount of the employer's lien is deducted and
the excess goes to the employee. This section substantially takes the
place of the repealed section 3854.28
"(a) No release or settlement under this chapter, with or without suit, is valid or
binding as to any party thereto without notice to both the employer and the employee,
with opportunity to the employer to recover the amount of compensation he has paid
or become obligated to pay and any special damages to which he may be entitled
under Section 3852, and opportunity to the employee to recover all damages he has
suffered and with provision for determination of expenses and attorney's fees as herein
provided.
"(b) The entire amount of such settlement, with or without suit, is subject to the
employer's full claim for reimbursement for compensation he has paid or become obli-
gated to pay and any special damages to which he may be entitled under Section 3852,
together with expenses and attorney fees, if any, subject to the limitations in this sec-
tion set forth.
"(c) Where settlement is effected, with or without suit, solely through the efforts
of the employee's attorney, then prior to the reimbursement of the employer, as provided
in subdivision (b) hereof, there shall be deducted from the amount of the settlement
the reasonable expenses incurred in effecting such settlement, including costs of suit, if
any, together with a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the employee's attorney, for
his services in securing and effecting settlement for the benefit of both the employer
and the employee.
"(d) Where settlement is effected, with or without suit, solely through the efforts
of the employer's attorney, then, prior to the reimbursement of the employer as pro-
vided in subdivision (b) hereof, there shall be deducted from the amount of the settle-
ment the reasonable expenses incurred in effecting such settlement, including costs of
suit, if any, together with a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the employer's attor-
ney, for his services in securing and effecting settlement for the benefit of both the
employer and the employee.
"(e) Where both the employer and the employee are represented by the same
agreed attorney or by separate attorneys in effecting a settlement, with or without
suit, prior to reimbursement of the employer as provided in subdivision (b) hereof, there
shall be deducted from the amount of the settlement the reasonable expenses incurred
by both the employer and the employee or on behalf of either, including costs of suit,
if any, together with reasonable attorneys' fees to be paid to the respective attorneys
for the employer and the employee, based upon the respective services rendered in se-
curing and effecting settlement for the benefit of the party represented. In the event
both parties are represented by the same attorney, by agreement, the attorney's fee
shall be based on the services rendered for the benefit of both.
"(f) The amount of expenses and attorneys' fees referred to in this section shall,
on settlement of suit, or on any settlement requiring court approval, be set by the court.
In all other cases these amounts shall be set by the appeals board. Where the employer
and the employee are represented by separate attorneys they may propose to the court
or the appeals board, for consideration and determination, the amount and division of
such expenses and fees."
28. Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 3854, at 273, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1949, ch.
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Section 3856(b)2 9 and section 3860(c)30 contain like provisions
when the recovery is obtained solely through the efforts of the employ-
ee's attorney. He may likewise be compensated on the basis of the re-
covery obtained for both the employer and employee, with the em-
ployer's lien subsequently taken out in full and the remainder going
to the employee.
Section 3856(c)31 and section 3860(e)12 contain provisions for
the situation in which the recovery, either by settlement or judgment, is
obtained through the efforts of both the employer and employee when
represented by either the same attorney or separate attorneys. Fees
and expenses will be awarded on the basis of the recovery to both
parties if they are represented by one attorney, or solely on the basis of
the recovery obtained by the party represented, if they are represented by
separate attorneys. Again, the excess over the employer's lien goes to
the employee.
Superficially, it may seem that the rights of the attorney are aug-
mented by the new code sections. In actuality, there is very little dis-
tinction between the rights of the attorney to his fees before and after
the 1959 amendments. Attorney's fees and expenses are now deducted
from the recovery before, rather than after,3  the employer's lien, thereby
apparently giving the attorney some increased assurance of recovering
his fees.
Unfortunately, any added security the attorney achieves under the
new language is far outweighed by the statute's unequal and unfair
treatment of the employee. This treatment not only raises serious con-
stitutional questions, but creates serious practical problems for the em-
ployee's attorney as well.
Hardship to the Employee under the Present Code
By far the most inequitable result of the present code sections is
the discordant effect on the employee's recovery. The problem can be
best illustrated by a hypothetical case. Employee A, while in the course
and scope of his employment with B, is injured as a result of the
negligence of C. B pays compensation benefits to A totaling $10,000.
In the meantime, A has filed a third party action against C and re-
covers $20,000.11 A's attorney prosecutes the suit alone, and B merely
120, § 1, at 355.
29. See note 26 supra.
30. See note 27 supra.
31. See note 26 supra.
32. See note 27 supra.
33. See notes 16 & 21 supra.
34. If the recovery is less than the lien, the attorney for the employee will be
compensated only for the recovery which he effected for the employer.
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files for a lien for the benefits paid. Assuming that A's attorney has a
30 percent contingent fee arrangement, he is entitled to a fee of $3000
from A. In addition, if the 30 percent is a reasonable fee in such ac-
tions, the same could be demanded by A's attorney under section 3856
for the $10,000 recovered for the employer. According to the new stat-
ute, however, the court must award all reasonable fees and expenses,
and then deduct the full amount of the lien.35 Therefore, it becomes
obvious that the fee attributable to the employer's share of the recovery is
being taken out of the employee's share." Thus, the final amounts re-
ceived would be approximately as follows: employer, $10,000; attor-
ney for A, $6000; employee, $4000.
If the employer exercises his right to sue independently of the
employee, 37 rather than simply file for benefits paid, the results under
sections 3856 and 3860 are just as unfair. The employer can have his
attorney's fees deducted from the amount recovered in excess of the
lien.18 The employee in this situation may have to pay a reasonable
fee for services the attorney rendered both to the employer and to him,
even though he did not bring the suit.
Perhaps the most unjust result is encountered when both parties are
represented by separate attorneys. In this case, under sections 3856
and 3860, the fees for both attorneys can be deducted from the em-
ployee's portion of the recovery and the employer then can have his lien
deducted in full, with the remaining sum going to the employee.
Constitutionality of Paying Employer's Attorney's Fees
Out of Employee's Recovery
At least one court has refused to follow the statutory method of
deducting attorney's fees on the grounds that the statute is unconstitu-
tional. In Gurzi v. U.S. Rubber Co.,39 Judge McCarthy of the Los An-
geles Superior Court denied the employer's motion to have his attorney's
fees deducted from the employee's portion of the third party judgment.
He ruled that such a deduction would deprive the employee of his
property without due process of law and would deny him the equal
protection of the laws.
The earliest case in which the constitutional aspect of the statute
was considered was Dodds v. Stellar °.4  Although the majority avoided
35. See CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3856(c), 3860(b)-(e); see notes 26 and 27 supra.
36. See Moreno v. Venturini, 1 Cal. App. 3d 286, 81 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1969);
Johnson v. L.D.S. Trucking, 254 Cal. App. 2d 496, 62 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1967); Green v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 27 Cal. Comp. Cases 278 (1962); Soffish v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 27 Cal. Comp. Cases 286 (1962).
37. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852.
38. Id. §§ 3856(a), 3860(b).
39. 31 Cal. Comp. Cases 343 (Super. Ct. 1966).
40. 30 Cal. 2d 496, 183 P.2d 658 (1947).
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the issue completely, Justice Carter in dissent vigorously attacked the
statute on constitutional grounds.41 Although the case was decided un-
der the 1937 version of the statute, it is still relevant since the effect of
of the statute was somewhat similar to the present one. In his dissent,
Justice Carter found that the statute violated both the privileges and
immunities and the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment.
At the outset it should be noted that the majority opinion
holds . ..that the workmen's compensation law, properly inter-
preted, provides that the employer may have his attorney's fees
paid from the judgment against the tort feasor when he [the em-
ployer] brings the action, but the employee may not when he [the
employee] brings the action, and that means .. .that such fees
come out of the portion of the surplus that would be payable to the
employee after the employer is reimbursed; that is, the employer
would be entitled to have all of the fees paid out of the employee's
share of the judgment. There is not even a sharing of those fees
between the employer and the employee. On the other hand
when the employee sues he is not entitled to subject the recovery
on behalf of the employer to the payment of any portion of such
fees. He must pay them all. Suppose the compensation paid to
the employee was $4,000, the attorney's fee a 25 per cent con-
tingency, and the recovery from the tort feasor was $4,000. The
employer would be made whole and the employee would suffer a
total loss of $1,000 or his attorney would receive no fee. If the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are so construed
they are clearly discriminatory and violate the privilege and im-
munities and equal protection provisions of the 14th Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.42
Justice Carter went on to discuss Builders' Supply Depot v. 0'-
Conner,4" a case involving the mechanic's lien laws.44 In this particular
statute, there was a provision for attorney's fees for the lien claimant
bringing the action, but there was no similar right for the defendant.
The supreme court held this aspect of the law to be unconstitutional by
both federal (as a denial of equal protection of the laws) and state
standards. The court referred to the law as one which "gives an attor-
ney's fee to one party in an action and denies it to the other, and allows
such a fee in one kind of action and not in other kinds of actions where,
as in the statute here in question, the distinction is not founded on con-
stitutional or natural differences. ... "45
Justice Carter also relied upon the case of Gulf, Colorado & Santa
Fe Railway v. Ellis,6 in which the United States Supreme Court de-
clared unconstitutional a Texas statute that allowed attorney's fees to a
41. Id. at 506, 183 P.2d at 665.
42. Id. at 507, 183 P.2d at 665.
43. 150 Cal. 265, 88 P. 982 (1907).
44. Cal. Stats. 1885, ch. 152, 1195, at 146.
45. 150 Cal. at 268, 88 P. at 983.
46. 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
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prevailing plaintiff but not to a prevailing defendant.
These same cases were relied upon by Judge McCarthy in his
opinion in Gurzi v. U. S. Rubber Co.47 In addition to the equal pro-
tection argument, Judge McCarthy also found a taking of property with-
out due process of law:
The net effect of this is to force the injured employee to pay
his employer's attorney's fees even though he did not employ such
attorneys, gained no benefit from their services, and probably
would have welcomed their absence.
The judgment for damages so obtained by the injured em-
ployee is a form of property. The award may include not only
the recovery of medical expenses and compensation payments for
which the employer has a lien, but also the pain and suffering,
loss of earning capacity and other items as to which the employer
has no interest whatever. Under the statute the employer (or
his insurance carrier) is made whole for the full amount of medical
payments and compensation paid under the workmen's compensa-
tion law. If the employee must pay the employer's attorney's fees
it can come only from property of the employee, being that portion
of the judgment owned solely by him.
It must be remembered that in this situation the employee
has not invaded the rights of anyone. . . . To require an em-
ployee to pay his employer's attorney's fees when the employee
has not violated the rights of another and has himself been dam-
aged, is clearly a taking of his property without due process of
law.48
Unfortunately, this opinion was rendered by a superior court in
ruling on a motion before it, and therefore has little, if any, binding effect
on other courts.
The court of appeal was faced with a similar constitutional attack
upon the statute in Johnson v. L.D.S. Trucking Co.,4" but was able
to avoid the issue by holding that the employee's attorney did not qualify
for reimbursement under section 3860(c). The court did indicate, in
a dictum, that if the section had applied, the attorney's fees would
have been deducted from the employee's share, not from the employer's
lien. On the issue of constitutionality, however, the court refused to
offer its opinion.50
The brief of the employee, on the other hand, was devoted al-
most entirely to constitutional arguments and in so doing developed a
different basis upon which a court may find a denial of equal protec-
47. 31 Cal. Comp. Cases 343 (Super. Ct. 1966).
48. Id. at 345.
49. 254 Cal. App. 2d 496, 62 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1967).
50. In the recent case of Moreno v. Venturini, I Cal. App. 3d 286, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 551 (1969), the court, by footnote, seemed to be inviting a constitutional chal-
lenge.
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tion.r51 It will be remembered that in the Builders' Supply case," the
court had found alternative methods for a denial of equal protection of
the laws.53 This protection could be denied by discrimination (1) be-
tween parties to the same action, and/or (2) between different actions
of the same type. 54 With regard to this second basis for denial of equal
protection of the laws, the employee's brief in the Johnson case cited
two situations analogous to the workmen's compensation problem. The
first situation mentioned was an action for indemnity by the owner of an
automobile against the driver for any sums which the owner has paid to
an injured third party as a result of the negligence of the driver. The
second situation analogized was an action by the general contractor or
owner of property for indemnity against a negligent subcontractor for
injuries sustained by employees as a result of a failure to maintain a
safe place to work or a violation of applicable safety orders. In neither
of the above instances has the legislature provided attorney's fees. From
this line of reasoning, the employee in Johnson concluded that any
provision for attorney's fees in the analogous third party actions involv-
ing workmen's compensation would be a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
Undoubtedly, the strongest arguments for uncons~itutinality are the
denial of due process, and the discrimination between parties to the same
action resulting in a denial of equal protection of the laws. There is no
reason why the employer should be put in the preferential position of
having his attorney's fees paid by the employee. Nor has he the right
to any amounts recovered by the employee in excess of any compensa-
tion payments that the employer may have made. Therefore, when
the employer's attorney's fees are taken out of the employee's share,
there is a taking of his property that violates the protection afforded by
the due process clause of the Constitution. For these reasons, it appears
that the courts have adequate grounds for following the lead of Judge
McCarthy in the Gurzi case and declaring the statute unconstitutional as
applied to attorneys' fees.
Effect on the Employee's Attorney
In addition to the hardship on the employee, the rules regarding
attorney's fees may also create difficult practical problems for the em-
ployee's attorney. This was evident in the case of Eldridge v. Truck In-
surance Exchange. 5 The employee, Eldridge, had brought an action
51. Brief for Respondent, Johnson v. L.D.S. Trucking Co., No. 23267 (vol. 4084,
Records of Court of Appeal), 254 Cal. App. 2d 496, 62 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1967).
52. 150 Cal. 265, 88 P. 982 (1907).
53. See note 48 supra.
54. See note 48 supra.
55. 253 Cal. App. 2d 365, 61 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1967).
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against the third party tortfeasor for injuries sustained in a collision
between Eldridge's taxi cab and the defendant's car. The employer
intervened in the action. Since liability was apparent and the de-
fendant had very limited funds, a judgment was entered by stipuation
of the parties for the insurance policy limit of $10,000. By this time
compensation benefits had been paid to Eldridge in the sum of $16,000.
The trial court awarded a fee of $3,000 to Eldridge's attorney with
the remainder going to the employer to satisfy part of the lien. The
court of appeal held that it was error to award the employee's attorney
any fees since he had not effected any recovery for his client as re-
quired by section 3856(c).
This is an extremely inequitable result since it is the plaintiffs
attorney who does the majority of the work in effecting any recovery at
all. As was stated in Bosch v. Standard Oil Co.,"8 a case decided under
the pre-1959 statutes:
As a practical matter, it is normally not desirable to have two
sets of counsel, representing different interests, attempting to try
each other's cases. . . . "[I]t is elemental that an intervener
who comes into the case . . . does so in subordination to and in
recognition of the propriety of plaintiffs case. Necessarily this
is so, because it is the plaintiff who has made himself liable to
his counsel for legal services ... and expenses involved in pre-
paring the case for ...trial . . . . [T]he plaintiff must be per-
mitted . . . to dominate . . . the suit . . . unfettered by the views
of the interveners. . . . [W]here there are several counsel some
one must be the absolute master of the litigation. . ... ,7
Thus, it is apparent that since it is the plaintiffs attorney that is the
principal figure in the litigation, he should receive some compensation
for the portion of the work he did in effecting recovery for the employer.
Yet if the attorney is to recover any compensation at all in a case like
Eldridge, he will have to obtain a worthless judgment in excess of the
policy limits rather than pursue the rational solution of a policy limits
settlement.
This was in fact done in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Moo-
ney.58 A judgment of $106,062.48 was obtained, but only $10,000
(the insurance policy limit) was ever likely to be paid. The court of
appeal worked out a formula whereby the actual recovery obtained was
divided by the amount due each party under the judgment, and
attorney's fees for both the employer and employee were determined
on the basis of the resulting fraction of the recovery. The court applied
this formula because the attorneys for the employee (actually his family
56. 193 Cal. App. 2d 426, 14 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1961).
57. Id. at 430, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 250, quoting Mann v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.
App. 2d 272, 280-81, 127 P.2d 92, 974 (1942).
58. 260 Cal. App. 2d 915, 67 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1968).
[Vol. 21
February 1970J AtTORNEY'S FEES
in this case since it was a wrongful death action) had secured a judg-
ment of over $100,000 for their clients even though it was not likely to
be paid.
Yet the same method of apportioning fees used in the Mooney
case could easily be applied to a case where the attorneys had acted
sensibly and had made a settlement where recovery beyond insurance
policy limits was not likely. It should not be necessary to go to the
expense of obtaining a worthless judgment. Furthermore, the policy
motivation in Mooney adds weight to this argument:
Not infrequently the third party causing the death or injury
is only partly covered by insurance or is without sufficient assets
to satisfy an entire judgment for the wrong done. State policy
should make it relatively easy for an injured employee or his
family, in case of his death, to engage the services of competent
attorneys and in such circumstances the attorneys should have a
decent priority in the matter of fees for the work which they do.
The legislature saw fit to give them a preference with respect to
moneys actually collected on such judgments, even in advance of
the moneys payable to the employer for what he has advanced. 59
Attorney's Fees and Credits
Finally, a discussion of the inequities and pitfalls of the Labor
Code's treatment of attorney's fees in third party actions would not be
complete unless one further stumbling block was mentioned. Section
3861110 of the Labor Code provides that an employer may receive a
credit for future liability for compensation payments. Thus, if the em-
ployee receives an amount above any compensation benefits already paid,
that sum may be credited against any future payments by the em-
ployer for additional temporary disability or permanent disability arising
from the same accident.
The question then arises whether or not the amount credited to the
employer includes attorney's fees. An example will illustrate the prob-
lem. A, the employee, receives a $9000 judgment against the third
party tortfeasor;-B, the employer, applies for a credit since A is per-
manently disabled. A's attorney will probably receive about one-third
of the recovery as his fee. Thus, if the entire judgment ($9000) is
credited to the employer, the employee is in a worse position than before
the judgment since the employer's liability is reduced by $3000 that
the employee never really received. Fortunately, section 3861 seems to
59. Id. at 919, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
60. The section reads as follows: "The appeals board is empowered to and shall
allow, as a credit to the employer to be applied against his liability for compensation,
such amount of any recovery by the employee for his injury, either by settlement or
after judgment, as has not theretofore been applied to the payment of expenses or attor-
neys' fees pursuant to the provisions of sections 3856, 3858, and 3860 of this code, or
had not been applied to reimburse the employer."
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indicate that only the amount actually received by the employee can be
credited.6  In Cummingham v. Industrial Accident Commission,62
however, the Industrial Accident Commission held that only the attor-
ney's fees that were approved by the court or commission could be de-
ducted from the amount credited. Thus, if the attorney takes his
fee pursuant to his agreement with the employee and does not seek court
approval, the amount paid to the attorney will be credited against
the future liability of the employer as if the employee had actually
received it. Consequently, to protect the employee, the attorney must
apply to the court or commission for approval of his fees pursuant to
sections 3856 and 3860.
Conclusion
Sections 3856 and 3860 create an extremely unfair, if not uncon-
stitutional, burden upon the employee if the employer exercises his
rights in regard to attorney's fees. The employee's attorney is also
placed in a very uncomfortable position, for if he exercises his right to
be reimbursed for his services to the employer, then he reduces his own
client's recovery by whatever amount the court awards. Furthermore,
he may not receive any fee if he does not obtain a judgment or settlement
in excess of the compensation claim.
While the inequities of the statutes could be avoided by entering
into an agreement with all the parties for distribution of the cost and
expenses,6" such agreements are not always possible. Indeed, it may be
that such an agreement is unethical because the interests of the employee
and the employer may be adverse. 64 Ironically, a statutory provision,
properly drawn, could play an important part in the equitable distribu-
tion of the costs and fees of third party litigation. As presently worded,
however, the statutory scheme prevents rather than promotes equality.
L. Allan Songstad*
61. See note 60 supra.
62. 30 Cal. Comp. Cases 406 (1965).
63. See Branscum v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 232 Cal. App. 2d 352, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 682 (1965).
64. Such a possibility could arise under the rule enunciated in Witt v. Jackson,
57 Cal. 2d 57, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641 (1962). The supreme court in that case
imposed the requirement that the employer be free of liability before he can be reim-
bursed for any benefits he has paid. Id. at 72, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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